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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN H. JORDAN,
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent,

\

vs.

Case No. 7347

COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMpANY OF UTAH, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant from a verdict
and judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
defendant in the sum of $500.00, rendered by the Third
District Court in a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover
for damages claimed to have been sustained by him as a
result of drinking from a bottle of contaminated CocaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Cola. Defendant also appeals from the Order of District
Court denying defendant's motion for a new trial.
In this brief, we shall refer to the parties as they
a:ppeared in the Court below.
THE FACTS
It is admitted by the pleadings that the defendant
corporation is a Utah corporation, and is engaged in
the bottling, distribution and sale of a soft drink generally
known as Coca-Cola. (R. 6, 7 & 19.)
At the trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to the
effect that he was an employee of the American Smelting
and Refining Company (R. 78) and that on or about
the 5th day of October, 1948, he purchased a bottle of
Coca-Cola from a Coca-Cola Dispensing Machine, located
on his employer's premises. (R. 79.)
The plaintiff drank from the bottle of Coca-Cola,
what he described as ''a big slug'' of the beverage and
at that time he discovered a large fly in his mouth.
(R. 80.) About an hour later the plaintiff claims he
became sick and nauseated and was sick intermittently
for three days thereafter, suffering from nausea and
diarrhea. (R. 81, 83.)
The plaintiff's Exhibit ''A,'' a bottle of Coca-Cola
containing two flies, was identified by the plaintiff as
the bottle from which he drank, and was received in
evidence by the Court. Plaintiff further testified that
after he had purchased the bottle he removed the cap,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and that the cap came off "fairly hard" and about the
san1e as caps from other bottles, '"'hich he had removed
on the same day. (R. 89.) On cross-exa1nination the
plaintiff adn1itted that he did not consult a doctor and
that he did not miss any time from 'vork. (R. 905.) He
further testified on cross-examination that he svvallowed
one fly and that he discovered another fly in his mouth,
vvhich he expectorated and then put back in the bottle,
and that there vvas a third fly remaining in the bottle.
(R. 93, 99.)
The testimony of the plaintiff, as to spitting out the
fly after drinking from the bottle of Coca-Cola, was
corroborated by the testimony of two fellow employees,
Keith Wiseman (R. 99, 101) and Leslie L. Cramer
(R. 112, 113.)
George D. Walker, a truck driver in the employ of
the defendant, testified that the plant of the- American
Smelting and Refining Company was on his route (R..
103), and that he served the particular dispensing
machine from which the plaintiff received the contaminated bottle of Coca-Cola. He testified that the dispensing
machine was the type known as Venderlator number 242,
and that that type of machine would hold ten cases of
Coca-Cola. The machine had 22 racks, each holding 11
bottles of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola was purchased frorn
the machine by inserting a nickel in the slot provided
for that purpose, which tripped a mechanism and automatically served a cold bottle of Coca-Cola. The machine
also had a reserve compartment, holding 4 cases of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Coca-Cola. In addition to the reserve compartment in
the vending machine, additional reserve stocks of CocaCola were kept in the office of the American Smelting
and Refining Company's foreman. Guards employed
by. the refining company loaded reserve stocks into the
dispensing machine on weekends. (R. 103.)
Les Anderson, Kelsey Rosander, or one of the
guards employed by the American Smelting and Refining
Company serviced the Coca-Cola dis:pensing 1nachine on
the night shift.
Bottles of Coca-Cola stored in reserve in the foreman's office were not locked up. They were stacked by
the forman's desk. (R. 104.) The Coca-Cola delivered
to the American Smelting and Refining Company was
actually sold to the American Smelting and Refining
Company. It was the custom for the witness to service
the machine every day. (R.106.)
On cross-examination, Walker testified that the dispensing machine was leased to the American Smelting
and Refining Company and that the Coca-Cola was sold
to the American Smelting and Refining Company in bulk.
He reiterated on cross-examination that Coca-Cola might
be removed from the reserve compartment of the vending
machine to the mechanism of the vending machine by
employees of the .American Smelting and Refining Company. (R. 107.) The defendant corporation had nothing
to do with money taken from the vending machine.
(R. 108.)
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Les Anderson, head guard for the American S1nelting
and Refining Company, testified that he, together "\vith
another employee of American Smelting' and Refining
Company, \vould collect the money fron1 the -vending
machine and would refill the -vending 1nachine vvhen necessary, which was about once a week. (R. 109.) The "\vitness, together \Yith Rosander and the g'uards en1ployed
by the American Smelting and Refining Company, had
the keys to the dis:pensing machine and some of then1
filled the vending machine with Coca-Cola on the night
shift at American Smelting and Refining Company as
a part of their job.
The evidence on behalf of the defendant was to
the effect that the most modern and best possible equip~
ment was utilized by the defendant corporation in the
washing of bottles, bottling of Coca-Cola, and inspection
of the finished product; and that defendant corporation
utilized every scientific inv~ntion known to man to assure
that the product distributed by it for sale on the public
market would be pure and wholesome.
Peter A. Hanes, the maintenance man for the defendant corporation, testified that he had been employed in
that capacity by the defendant for the four years immediately preceding, and that he had been an employee of
the defendant for seven years all together. Prior to that
time he had worked for the Doctor Pepper Company,
another bottler of soft drinks, for five years, also in the
capacity of maintenance man. (R. 116.) The witness
was familiar with the Bottler's Industrial Manual, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trade journal of the bottling industry, which publication
he received regularly. He had also visited bottling plants
in other parts of the country and had observed their
operation.
The witness identified the defendant's Exhibit 1, as
a diagram of the Meyer-Dumore Washing Machine which
was the type used by the defendant in its bottle washing
operation. He testified that the washing machine \vas
located in the front part of the defendant's plant in a
room with a cement floor, plaster walls painted "\vhite
and screened windows. The room was regularly s:prayed
with disinfectants. (R. 117.)
Mr. Hanes explained in some detail the defendant's
bottle washing process, which can be briefly summarized
as follows:
As the bottles enter the washing machine they first
go into a rinse tube, which tube goes up into the bottle and
rinses it for four seconds with water heated to a temperature of about 70°. The rinsing process is repeated at
the next rack, making two rinses for each bottle.
After rinsing, the bottles proceed to the number 1
caustic tank, which contains a 3% caustic solution, heated
to a temperature of 110°. The bottles are in caustic
tank No. 1 for four minutes. When the bottles are removed from the caustic tank the caustic is drained out
of the bottles and the bottles continue in to another tank
heated to a temperature of 150° and containing a 2%
caustic solution where the bottles remain for an additional period of four minutes. From the second caustic
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tank the bottles proceed to still another caustic tank containing a solution of 1% raustic at a ten1perature of 130°
and ag·ain they are bathed in the caustic solution for four
minutes. ....\.fter being drained the bottles go through a
fresh "\Vater tank, heated to a ten1perature of 100° vvhere
they are thoroughly rinsed for a period of three and a
half to four minutes. The bottles are again drained and
then they go over to the first set of bottle brushes, which
are outside brushes.
The bottles then go to the ''first rinse,'' where they
receive an inside rinse. The rinsing tube shoots water
into the bottle at 60 pounds pressure cleaning the bottle
on the inside as it goes u:p and down, and remains there
shooting water for a period of four seconds. After leaving the rinse tube, bottles come to the first inside brushes,
which are water lubricated. The brushes go inside the
bottles and brush the bottoms of the bottles on the
inside at 60 pounds pressure and at 1200 revolutions per
minute. Water goes through the center of the brushes
as they revolve. The brushes are inside the bottle a
period of about 4 seconds. The brushing process is
repeated by a second set of brushes. From the brushing
process the bottles go through another set of rinses like
the ones heretofore described. After two more rinses
the bottles go past the visual inspector and on to the
filling machine.
As bottles pass the inspector they are in a single
line. The inspector is aided by a fluorescent light which
has a non-glare plate behind it. It is the job of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ins:pector to examine the bottles as they go by the inspection light and to remove any defective bottles. After
inspection the bottles go to the syruper where syrup is
deposited in the bottles. While the bottle is in the
syruper, it is protected from contamination by "a little
collar about 2 inches in diameter," \vhich comes down
over the bottle while it is being syruped. The bottle then
receives the charge of carbonated water and during this
process it is similarly protected from contamination.
From there the bottle goes to the crowner, where it is
capped. ·After being capped the bottle moves to the
mixer where it is turned upside down and S'pun at
approximately three thousand revolutions per minute.
The bottle then proceeds to the automatic electric eye
inspecting machine. That machine automatically rejects
any bottle having any defect, or containing any foreign
substance.
Hanes further testified that water used in the bottling
process is regular city water, specially treated and
filtered, and that from the time such water is treated
until it is placed in the individual bottles of Coca-Cola,
it is always in a sealed container and never exposed to
flies or insects. 'The syrup used in the Coca-Cola also is
in sealed containers during the entire bottling process.
The syrup is twice screened, once as it leaves the barrel
in which it was received by defendant, and again just
before it goes into the individual bottles.
Hanes further testified that the automatic electric
eye inspecting machine had been tested by running
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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through it test bottles of Coca-Cola, containing various
foreign substances.
Defendant's Exhibit 6 is a bottle of Coca-Cola containing a small 12 shot, defendant's Exhibit 5 is a bottle
of Coca-Cola containing a ·piece of cork, and defendant's
Exhibit 4 is a bottle of Coca-Cola containing a bristle
from a brush. ..~..\11 of those bottles had been passed
through the inspecting machine many tin1es and in every
case the inspecting machine had rejected those test
bottles. ( R. 118 to 128.)
Hanes further testified that the equipment used by
the defendant was the most up-to-date and modern
equipment in use in the bottling industry, and that there
was nothing better or more modern any place. In his
experience he had never seen a finer bottling plant than
the defendant's. Hanes also testified that the brushes
used in the bottle washing process were inspected twice
a day for wear and tear.
Raymond Wilmert, a field engineer for the Radio
Corporation of America, with four years of training at
the University of Illinois and 20 years experience with
Western Electric Company and R.C.A. (R. 138-9), testified as follows :
R. C.A. was a seller of bottle inspecting machines
(hereinafter referred to as B.I.M.) and there was a B.I.M.
machine installed at the defendant's plant and it was
there in September and October of 1948. (R. 139.) The
operation of the B.I.M. was described as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the time the bottles of Coca-Cola pass through
the B.I.M. the bottles are standing still, but the fluid
vv!thin them is whirling. Any sediment, p.arti~les of dust,
or any foreign substance in the bottle of Coca-Cola will
interrupt the hean1 of light and cause the reject mechanism on the B.I.M. to operate and "kick'' the bottle out
of the line. If anything goes wrong with the B.I.M. it
rejects all bottles rather than permitting defective bottles
to pass through. The most difficult part of the task of
maintaining the machine is to keep it adjusted so that
it doesn't reject too many bottles.
The B.I.M. receives a maintenance inspection once
per month, which inspection is performed by the witness.
During the tune he had ·performed the maintenance of
this machine, he had never found it so out of order that
it would not kick out 'any bottles having foreign matter
in them, and it would be impossible for the machine to
get out of order in that manner.
Mr. Wilmert further testified very positively that
the Plaintiff's Exhibit "A," which was the bottle of
Coca-Cola containing flies and other foreign matter
from which the plaintiff drank, could not possibly go
through the inspecting machine without being rejected.
He also testified that he had many times seen defendant's
Exhibits 4, 5 and 6, test bottles used by the defendant
and containing various foreign articles which have heretofore been described, :pass through the machine on many
occasions and that in every instance the machine had
rejected them. The witness testified that he knew of
no better machine on the market than the one used by the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
defendant, and that he had never seen a better or 1nore
up-to-date bottling plant. (R. 140-143.)
On cross-examination, l\lr. \V.ihnert testified that the
B.I.M. 'vould reject bottles 'Yith bubbles (R. 144) that
the B.I.M. "~ould reject a bottle containing a fly in the
botton1 covered 'vith syrup (R. 145.) On redirect examination he testified that 'vhenever the B.I.!1:. failed it
rejected all bottles, and it 'vas necessary for the defendant to suspend bottling operations until repairs could
be effected. (R. 146.)
Dr. Louis R. Curtis, a bacteriologist and sanitarian
had had four years training at Cornell University, a
doctor's degree in bacteriology and chemistry, experience
as a bacteriologist for the Dairymen's League in New
York State, two years of service with the National Dairy
in Baltimore, Maryland, and three years experience as
Chief Sanitarian in Salt Lake City (R. 147), testified
that the defendant's building was modern, well planned
and the last word in construction (R. 148); that it would
be impossible for a bottle to go through the defendant's
washing machine with three large flies in it (R. 149);
that the hot caustic baths would tend to dissolve any
organic matter present in the bottle (R. 150) ; and that
it was highly improbable that any bottle could go through
the defendant's washing process and still contain flies
in the condition of those contained in the bottle known
as Plaintiff's Exhibit "A."

J. T. Holding, a health officer of Salt Lake City
Corporation for six years, em·ployed as an inspector of
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food and drinks, testified that it vvas his duty, among
others, to inspect the establishments of bottling companies, and that from March through September, 1948,
he had inspected the defendant's plant regularly. (R.
154.) The inspection was a general inspection, and included ins·pection for rodents and insects. and inspection
of windows and toilets. In September, 1948, screens at
the defendant's plant were up, and were well kept. (R.
155.) The defendant's p·lant was one of the best beverage
plants in the city. It had good equipment and was well
kept up. He had never had any complaint of the defendant's plant and had never seen insects in the defendant's
plant. (R. 162.) His inspection records showed no flies
present in defendant's plant. (R. 156).
At this point in the case both parties rested and
the defendant moved for a directed verdict. After considerable argument and discussion, leave was given to
the plaintiff to reopen his case for the purpose of showing
that the contaminated bottle from which the plaintiff
drank was actually bottled by the defendant corporation.
(R. 162.)
Kelsey Rosander, an employee of the American
Smelting and Refining Company (R. 164), testified that
when the dispensing machine at the American Smelting
and Refining Plant was dry, he put reserve stocks of
Coca-Cola into the machine. He and Les Anderson had
keys to the machine. (R. 165). On cross-examination he
testified that the Chief Watchman at the American
Smelting and Refining plant has a key to the vending
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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machine, and when the Chief \~\Tatchman was not ·present
other employees of the . A.merican Sn1elting and Refining
Company used the Chief ,V-atchman's key. (R. 169.)
Frank Baer, an employee of A1nerican Smelting
and Refining Company (R. 170), testified that it w~s
his duty to O.K. bills to the defendant company and that
he never O.K. 'd any bills to any other Coca-Cola Company (R. 171.) On cross-examination he testified that
American Smelting and Refining Company bought and
received Coca-Cola from the defendant Company and
that American Smelting and Refinery Company leased
the vending machine.
Les Anderson, another employee of American Smelting and Refining Company testified that he, Ros-ander
and the guards had a key to the vending machine and
that all together 14 people had access to the vending
machine. (R. 175, 177.)
George Walker testified on cross-examination that
at times when he had been loading the vending machine
men at the American Smelting and Refining Company
plant had come to him and exchanged bottles of CocaCola, asking to receive a cold bottle in place of a warm
bottle. vVhen such exchanges were made the warm bottles
were loaded into the machine. (R. 181.) Mr. Walker
did not know where the men got the warm bottles. (R.
182.) On redirect examination, he testified that he never

examined the warm bottles to see whether or not they
had been opened. (R. 182.)
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Donald A. Carmichael, manager of the defendant
company (R. 183), testified that there were Coca-Cola
Bottling Companies at Ogden, Pays·on, Logan and Vernal
and that those p~lants were not owned by the defendant
company. He further testified that Coca-Cola comes
into the Salt Lake territory from other territories.
(R. 184.)
In view of the fact that the verdict was for the
plain tiff, we recognize that all conflicts in evidence must
be, for purposes of this appeal, resolved in favor of the
plaintiff and that all facts necessary to support the
verdict must be accepted as true if supported by credible
evidence. For purposes of this brief, we assume as true
that the plaintiff received a contaminated bottle of CocaCola from the vending machine at the American Smelting
and Refining Plant; that he drank from the same, and
that by reason thereof he became ill as described by him.
On the other hand, the evidence on the part of the
defendant to the effect that the defendant's pJant was
equipped with the most modern and best ~equipment for
bottling and distributing Coca-Cola, and that every
human and mechanical precaution had been observed
in order to insure that the beverage produced by the
defendant company would be pure and wholesome, must
be accepted as true, since such evidence is powerfully
corroborated by the testimony of disinterested experts
and is uncontradicted in any way, shape or form. It
must also be accepted as true that when Coca-Cola bottled
by the defendant corporation was delivered to the American Smelting and Refining Company Plant, it passed
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from the possession of the defendant corporation and into
the possession and control of . A.1nerican Smelting and
Refining Company and its en1ployees. The defendant
corporation did not haYe any control 'vhatsoever over the
bottle n1arked as ·plaintiff's Exhibit ".A. '' at the tinll~
plaintiff purchased it. It had been delivered to the American Smelting and Refining Company's plant at son1e
time ·previous to the incident and was under the con1plete
control of the Alnerican Smelting and Refining Company
and its employees.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant assigns as error the following Orders and
Rulings of the Trial Court and actions on the part of
counsel for the plaintiff and actions of the jury:
1. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
2. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant'8
requested instruction No. A.
3. The Court erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested instruction No. 1 in the language
requested.
4. The Court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction No. 5 in the language requested.
5.

The Court erred in giving instruction No. 6.

6. The verdict is contrary to law and is unsupported
by the evidence.
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7. Counsel for the plaintiff "\Vas guilty of misconduct
amounting to prejudicial error by continually referring
to other law suits against this defendant, with the apparent purpose of causing the jury to believe that the defendant company was quite frequently in litigation of a
similar nature and therefore was guilty frequently of
putting contaminated Coca-Cola on the market. (R. 132,
144, :and 159.)
8. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ·THE D·EFENDANT; BUT, ON THE· CONTRARY, THE RECORD SHOWS AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE
DEFENDAN~T EXERCISED THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF CARE.
The argument under this :point will cover assignments of error numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8.
A.

THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE CONTAM·

INATED BOTTLE OF COCA-COLA FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF DRANK
WAS BOTTLED BY THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION.

It is the position of the defendant, insisted upon by
it throughout the trial, that the plaintiff wholly failed
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to sho'Y that the defendant bottled the bottle of Coca-Cola
from which plaintiff drank. .A.pparently the trial judge
agreed with the Yie'Y of the defendant at the time both
parties rested. Ho,vever, when the trial court indicated
his inclination to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed
verdict, plaintiff requested and \Yas granted leave to reopen his case for the purpose of sho,ving that the contaminated bottle really '\Yas bottled by the defendant
company.
Taking the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff's
view, we find that the defendant did regularly sell to
the American Smelting and Refining Company, CocaCola in case lots. We also have the testimony of Frank
Baer, an employee· of American Smelting and Refining
Company, that it was his duty to O.K. bills to the defendant company, and that he never O.K. 'd any bills to any
other Coca-Cola company. That constitutes the entire
evidence in the record which in any way tends to indicate
that the defendant bottling company bottled the bottle
of Coca-Cola from which the plaintiff drank.
On the other hand, there is the testimony of Mr.
Carmichael, the manager of the defendant company, to
the effect that there are other Coca-Cola bottling companies in Utah, located in Ogden, Payson, Logan and
Vernal, and that such Coca-Cola bottling establishments
are in no way connected with the defendant. Mr. Carmichael also testified that bottles of Coca-Cola bottled

by other plants frequently came into the territory served
by the defendant company. ·
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The testimony of Frank Baer does not exclude the
possibility of American Smelting and Refining Company
having purchased Coca-Cola from other bottling establishments. Other employees of the American Smelting
and Refining Company might well have O.K. 'd such
bills ; or transactions, with other Coca-Cola companies,
might have been handled on a cash basis. Moreover, there
is the testimony of George Walker, an employee of the
defendant company who testified for the ·plaintiff, that
on occasions when he was loading the vending machine
at the American Smelting and Refining plant, he frequently exchanged bottles of cold Coca-Cola for warm
bottles of Coca-Cola which were brought to him by
employees, and that he did not know where these warm
oottles of Coca-Cola came from. Very possibly such
warm bottles of Coca-Cola could have been purchased
from dealers who received them from bottlers other than
the defendant. Whether the bottle from which plaintiff
drank was one of those bottled by defendant, or whether
it originated elsewhere, cannot be determined from the
record. In this case, the plaintiff failed, ·at the very
outset, to carry his burden. Not only did he fail to show
fault as we shall hereafter point out, but he absolutely
failed even to show that the bottle in question was hottled
by the defendant company.

B.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD

OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT.

Assuming, without in any way conceding, that there
is sufficient evidence in the record to. justify ·an inference
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that the defendant 'Yas the bottler of the contaminated
bottle of Coca-Cola, there is absolutely no evidence of
any fault on the p·art of the defendant in its bottling
process. Plaintiff's entire case rests upon the fact that
there were three flies and son1e other foreign rna terial in
the bottle of Coca-Cola from "\Vhich he drank. There is
not the slightest evidence as to "~hen or how these impurities got into the bottle of Coca-Cola. One searches
the record in vain for any hint as to any delict or shortcoming on the part of the defendant in its bottling process.
It is a fundamental princip·le of the law of negligence,
too well established to require citation of authority, that
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the defendant was guilty of some
act or omission causing the injury to the plaintiff. It is
equally well established that negligence or wrong cannot
be inferred from the mere fact of injury. This rule is
well stated in 38 Am. Jur. 983-4, Negligence, Sec. 290,
where it is said :
f',

''Apart from the rule of res ipsa loquitur,
negligence cannot be assumed from the mere fact
of ,an accident and an injury. The mere fact that
an accident happens is not evidence of negligence.
Thus the mere fact t,hat an injury has been sustained, if it can in an;y practical way be cons~idered
apart from other circumstances, certainly will not
give rise to an inference or presumption that the
injury is due to the negligence of one who is made
defenda.nt to an action based thereon. Clearly,
mere proof that an accident injurious to the
plaintiff has occurred does not justify a verdict
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or judg1nent imp osing liability therefor UJP'On the
defendant. If the evidence .does not show any
negligence on the part of the defendant, there can
be no recovery, regardless of the freedom of the
plaintiff from any negligence on his ·part. The
cause of .an injury must be connected with the one
sued for damages resulting therefrom, by direct
evidence either that it w·as his act, or t.hat it w·as
under his control, before it can be presu.med that
he w~as negligent. If the evidence does not show
any negligence on the part of the defendant, there
can be no recovery, no matter how free from
negligence the facts show t~he plaintiff to be. The
evidence must point to the fact that the defendant
w.as guilty of negligence. A careful analysis of
the better-considered decisions shows that negligence will not be inferred or presumed from the
mere fact of injury when that fact is as consistent
with an inference that the injury was unavoidable as it is with negligence; therefore, if it be
left in doubt what the cause of the accident was,
or if it may as well be attributable to the ~act of
God or unk:now·n causes as to negligence, there is
no such presumption/' (Italics added.)
1

In the case of ·Co.ca-'Cola Bottling Company v-s. Row·lan, 16 Tenn. App. 184, 66 S.W. 2d 272, the facts were very
similar to those in the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff had :purchased a bottle of Coca-Cola from a newsstand and had taken it to a restroom to drink. She returned to the newsstand some ten minutes later with
the bottle of Coca-Cola about two-thirds full and with a
dead and decomposed mouse in it. The last previous delivery of Coca-Cola to the newsstand had been about
six days before that incident. The Coca-Cola was kept
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in a storeroom until it \Ya8 needed in the cooler for sale.
In that ease, as in the case at bar, the only eYidence of
negligence \Yas the presence of tht> foreign matter in
the bottled beverage.

In reversing a judgn1ent for the plaintiff, the Tennessee Court said:
'' '\Tithout discussing the facts as described by
the record further, we are of the opinion that the
plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant
\Yas guilty of any negligence in the matter of
bottling Coca-Cola. * * * We are constrained to
reach the conclusion that there is no proof of
negligence. ''
The Tennessee Court also quoted 'vith approval the
following language from Crigger

vs~

Coca-Cola Bottling

Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.\V. 155:
''However exacting the duty or high the degree of care to furnish pure foods, beverages, and
medicines, we believe with Judge Cooley as expressed in Brown v_s. Marshall, * * *. ( 47 Mich.
576, 11 N. W. 392), that negligence is a necessary
elen~ent in t.he right of action, and the better
authorities have not gone so far as to dis'J}1ense
with actual negligence as a p~rerequisite to the
liability. In fact, there is no logical basis of liability for personal injury without some negligent
act of omission. '' (Italics added.)
In the case of Ash vs. Child's Dining Ha.ll ·Co., 231
Mass. 86, 12 N.E. 396, the plaintiff, a guest in the defendant's restaur·ant, ate a p.iece of berry pie. A small
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tack was imbedded in the pie, and the plaintiff 'vas injured by eating it. The pie was baked by the defendant.
In holding that there was no evidence of negligence, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
''There is nothing in the record from which
it can he inferred that the harm to the plaintiff
resulted from any failure of duty on the part of
the defendant. The precise cause of her injury
is left to conjecture. It may as reasonably be
attributed to a condition for which no liability
attached to the defendant as to one for which it is
responsible. Under such circumstances the plaintiff does not sustain the burden of proving tortious conduct upon the defendant by a fair preponderance of all the evidence, and the verdict
ought to be directed accordingly.''
To the same effect see :

O'Brien VB. Louis K. Liggett ·Company, (Mass.) 152
N.E. 57;
Ho.rn &; H. Baking Company vs. Leiber, 25 F. 2d
449, 28 N.C.C.A. 189;
Werner vs. Armour

~&

Co., 320 Pa. 440, 183 A. 48.

In th·e case of Enloe vs. ·Charlotte Coca-~Cola Bottling
Co-., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S.E. 582, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina announced the rules governing cases of
this sort in that jurisdiction. Proposition No. 4 stated
by the Court was as follows :
''That the wholesomeness of ·the product which
proximately results in injury to the consumer
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must be traced to the negligence of the manufacturer, bottler, or packer. Keith vs. Tobacco
Company, :207 ~. C. G43, 178 S. E. 90. ''
This rule has subsequently been reiterated and followed in a number of subsequent North Carolina cases.
See:
JfcLeod vs .. Lexington Coca-'Cola Bottling Company,
(N.C.) 194 S.E. 82.
Thompson vs. Dr. Pepper Bottlers Corporation,
(N.C.) 8 S.E. 2d 234.
Davis vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Asheville,
(N.C.) 44 S.E. 2d 337.
It is submitted that the foregoing cases set forth
the true and generally accepted rule, and they represent
a particularized application to a case of this sort, of the
general rule, well established in this jurisdiction, that
proof of injury is no proof of negligence.

C.

THE DOCTRINE oF

Res l'[J1Sa Loquitur

rs NOT AP-

PLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

The trial court apparently proceeded upon the
theory that this was a res ip~sa loquitur case, and in so
doing committed prejudicial error resulting from a misconception of that doctrine. It is well established in this
jurisdiction, as we shall hereafter more particularly
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point out, and it is the view of the better reasoned judicial opinions, and of the best text writers, that the doctrine of res ~p~sa loquitur can apply only in those cases
where the defendant had the exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the harm, at the time of the injury. As has been pointed out in the statement of facts
contained in this brief, the bottle of Coca-Cola from
which the plaintiff drank, was not in the exclusive control of the defendant, but, on the contrary, was completely beyond the control of the defendant, and was in
the sole custody, :possession and control of the American
Smelting & Refining Company until it was purchased

by the plaintiff, at which time it came within the plaintiff's exclusive control. These facts are established by
the plaintiff's own evidence and cannot be doubted.
The rule is stated thus in 38 Am. Jur., 989, Negligence, Sec. 295 :
''The conclusion to be drawn from the cases
as to what constitutes the rule of res ips~a liquitur
is that pvroof that the thing which caused the injury to the p~laintiff was under the control and
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, affords sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated by the courts
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant's want of care."
(Italics added.)
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And at pages 996-7, Sec. 300, of the sa1ue reference,
it is said:

··It i.s essent,:az to the .application of the doctrine of res ipsa loqnitur that it ap~pear that the
instrunlentality which produced the injury complained of was at the t·iJne of the injury under
the management o·r control of the defendant or
of his agents and servants. \When, ho~vever, it
appears that the victim had exclusive contrpl of
the offending thing, no imputation of resiP~onsi
bility ·1v·ill attach to the defendant. It is not only
necessary to show that the offending instrumentality was under the management of the defendant, but it must be shown that it proximately
caused the injury, or that the injury was caused
by some act incident to the control of the instrumentality. The doctrine does not ~apply where
the agency causing the accident was not under
the sole and exclusive control of the person sought
to be charged with the injury." (Italics added.)
And at page 1000, Sec. 303, it is further said :
''The res ipsa loquitur rule does not apply
where it appears that the accident was due to a
cause beyond the control of the defendant, .such
as the presence of vis major or the tortious act
of a stranger. Nor .does it apply where an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of
several causes, for some of which the defend()lnt
is not responsible. It should not be allowed to
apvp,ly whe.re, on proof of the occurrence, without
more, the matter still rests on conjecture alone or
the accident is just as reasonably attributable to
ot,her causes as of negligence. In other words, if
facts and circumstances of the occurrence give
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rise to conflicting inferences, one leading to the
conclusion of due care and the .other to the conclusion of negligence, the doctrine does not apply.
* * * The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable where the defendant has no control over
the premises, or where there is a divided responsibility and the damage may have resulted from
a cause over which the defendant has no control.''
(Italics added. )
The rule is stated thus in Shearntan & Redfield on
N eglig·ence, R.evised Edition, 153, Sec. 56:
''Control is a necessary prerequisite to application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The rule
is predicated amongst other things on the condition that the agency which has produced an injury is within the exclusive possession, control
and over-sight of the person sought to be charged
with negligence.''
The rule is stated thus by Dean Wigmore in his very
scholarly treatise on evidence :
"What the final accepted shape of the rule
[res ipsa loquitur] will be can hardly be predicted.
But the following considerations ought to limit
it: (1) The apparatus must be such that in the
ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be
expected unless from a careless ·construction, inspection or user; (2) both the inspection wnd user
must have been at the time of t,he injury in the
control of the party charged; ( 3) the injurious
occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by
the party injured." (Italics added.) IX Wigmore on Evidence, 380, Sec. 2509.
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The facts of Coca..:Cola Bottling Company vs. Row·lan, 16 Tenn..A.pp. IS±, 66 S.,,~. 2d 272, have been heretofore set forth in this brief, The court in tha.t case rejected the doctrine of res ip-sa loqui.tur as being n.ot applicable to the facts of that case, in the follo\Ying language:

"''T
e fully agree that, in order to apply the
rule of res ipsa loquitur, the thin_g causing the injury must have been under the control and management of the defendant at the time of the casualty."
In Enloe vs. Charlotte Coca-"Cola Bottling Company,
208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 502, the court, in rejecting the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, said:
''That in establishing the alleged negligence
of the manufacturer, bottler, or packer, the ~plain
tiff is not entitled to call to his aid the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. Lamb vs. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542,
135 S.E. 464, 29 A.L.R. 589 ; Cashwell vs. Bottling
Works, 174 N.C. 324, 93 S.E. 901; Perry vs. Bottling Company, supra [96 N.C. 175, 145 S.E. 14];
D·ail vs. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135, 18
L.R.A. (N.S.) 949; Note: 47 A.L.R. 148.''
The Enloe case has since been consistently followed
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See:
Ham/p,ton vs. Thomasville Coca..JCola Bottling Company, 208 N.C. 331, 180 S.E. 584;
Blackwell vs. ·Coca-Cola Bottling Compwny, 208 N.C.
751, 182 S.E. 469;
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Tickle vs. Hobgood, (N.C.) 4 S. E. 2d 444;
Davis vs. Coca-~Cola Bottling ·Company of Asheville,
(N.C.), 44 S.E. 2d 337;
Evans vs . Charlotte Pepsi Cola Company, (N.C.),
10 S.E. 2d 707.
The same principle is involved in cases where
bottled beverages have exploded while in the possession
of a retail dealer. In Wheeler vs. Laurel Bottling Works,
11 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743, the court, in rejecting the doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur said:
'' \V e do not think the doctrine of res ips.a loquitur applies in this case. The bottle at the time
of the injury was not under the control or management of the manufacturer. The unfortunate
occurrence appears to be one of those unforseen
accidents for which appellee under the facts of
this case should not be held liable. ''
See also Winfree v·s. Coc.a.JCola Bottling Works, 19
Tenn. App·. 144, 83 S.W. 2d 903, where the court said:
1

''The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only
when the instrumentality is wholly within the possession of the defendant and under its control and
management at the time of the casualty."
The same principle is ·also followed in cases involv.:
ing impurities in foods. See :
Ash vs. Child's Dining Hall CorJ'I)(pJany, 231 Mass. 86,
120 N.E. 396;
Jacobs vs. Childs Co., 166 N.Y.S. 798.
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For an excellent discussion of the "Thole question of
the necessity for defendant to have the exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the injury at the time
of the accident in order to make the doctrine of res ipsa
loqu.itur applicable, see Stanolind Oil and ~Gas Co. vs.
BHnce, (\\1 yo.), 62 P. 2d 1297.
,,...e turn no\Y to the Utah cases.
\\T e haYe been unable to discover any Utah case

closely similar in point of fact to the case now before
the Court. However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has been discussed by this court in many different cases.
No useful purpose could be subserved by reviewing the
Utah decisions treating this general subject. We merely
invite the court's attention to two of the more recent
opinions dealing with this question.
In the case of Jenson vs. S. H. Kress & Co., (Utah),

49 P. 2d 958, the plaintiff was injured by coming in contact with a splinter of glass projecting from a showcase
in the defendant's store. The evidence did not sho\v
how or when the glass was cracked. This court llnanimously held that the doctrine of res

~psa

loquitur was

not applicable.
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe, said:
''There was no evidence as to how the glass
got cracked, or how long it had been cracked before the plaintiff was cut by it. The plaintiff's
evidence did not go any further than to show that
the plaintiff had been injured by ~his piece of
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glass penetrating her abdomen while she was
brushing up against the counter. t.- * *
"The respondent contends that a case of negligence has been made out by showing that the
piece of jagged glass penetrated her abdomen
while she was moving along the -counter. :x· * *
''We cannot see how this case differs from the
Quinn Case, [Quinn vs. Utah Gas & C·oke Co., 42
Ut. 113, 129 P. 36, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 328]. In that
case a bottle of ink had spilled, and plaintiff's
dress was damaged by the ink running upon it.
In this case there was a cracked panel in the showcase and the person of plaintiff was injured. In
neither case did any one know ho,~.T the ink was
spilled or the glass broken. In both cases the
cause of the spilled ink or the broken glass may
h·ave been caused by some representative of the
company without negligence and unnoticed when
it was done, or, in both cases, it may have been
caused by the negligence of the company through
a servant. The difficulty is thart it is in the realm
of speculati.on, and under su.ch circumstances the
doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur cannot apply. It
applies where the thing from or by which the
apparent negligence speaks is shown to be under
the control or the management of the store and
the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of
things, does not or would not happen if those
· who had the management used the proper care.
Where the way in which the accident happened
warrants an inference of negligence, then the
mere happening speaks for itself. Even then it is
only evidence from which the jury may infer
negligence. It is not negligenGe in law. See Williamson v. Salt Lake & Ogden R. Co., 52 Utah 84,
172 P. 680, L.R.A. 1918F 588. If the circumstances
.a:re equally consistent with .a cause which would
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not be attributable to negligence, then the doctrine does not apply.'' (Italics added.)
The facts of the case at bar may well be paralleled
to the facts of th·e Jenson case. In the Jenson case there
was no evidence as to ho'v the glass 'vas cracked, or
how long it had been cracked, before the ·plaintiff was
cut by it. In the case at bar, there is no evidence as to
how the impure matter got into the bottle of Coca-Cola,
or for how long it had been there at the time the plaintiff drank from the bottle. In both cases the plain tiff's
evidence \Yent no further than to show the injury. In
both cases the circumstances of the injury \Vere such
that the injury might be as well attributed to causes for
which the defendant would not be responsible as to
causes for which the defendant would be responsible.
In the Jenson case it was held that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was not applicable, and a similar result
should follow in the case at bar.
In the recent case of Loos vs . Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, (Ut.), 108 P. 2d 254, in an action by the plaintiff against the gas company for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of an explosion of gas in a certain cabin of the Utah Motor Park, it was held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be enforced
against the gas company because it did not have any
control over the gas facilities where the explosion occurred. In that case, employees of the gas company
went on the premis-es of the Utah Motor Park only by
invitation. In the case at bar, employees of the defendant
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company went on the premises of the American Smelting
& Refining Company only at the invitation of the An1erican Smelting & Refining Company. They had no control over the vending machine from which the plaintiff
purchased the bottle of Coca-Cola. That machine was
leased to the American Smelting & Refining Company,
and was under its exclusive control.
From the foregoing authorities it is apparent that
the trial court erred in submitting this case to the jury
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is clearly
not applicable to the facts of this case.

D.

THE EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT IS

SO OVERWHELMING AS TO REQUIRE A HOLDING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.

We have heretofore argued at some length that the
plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to put to
the jury on the question of negligence. If the court
agrees with our argument in that respect, it will be unnecessary for the court to consider the '' D'' portion of
our argument under this point. However, -without jn
any way waiving our contentions under ''A,'' '' B, '' and
"C," of Point 1, we deem it advisable to present this
additional argument to the court in the event that the
court should not agree with our earlier contentions.
We have pointed out at some length in our statement of facts the great pains and extent to which the
defendant company went to insure that no impure products should be bottled by the defendant. Not only was
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there extensive testimony by tht:• defendant's Plnployee,
~Ir. Peter Hanes, as to the n1eticulous care \Vith which
bottles are "\vashed, filled and inspected, but there is also
very strong corroborating testimony on the part of three
disinterested expert "\Yitnesses, Mr. Raymond 'Vilmert,
Dr. Louis R. Curtis, and ~Ir. J. T. Holding. The testimony of these men "\Yas to the effect that it would be virtually impossible for a bottle containing dead flies to go
through the defendant's washing and bottling process
and through its double inspection system and reach the
open market. The plaintiff attempted in vain to discredit the testimony of these 'vitnesses. No question
could be raised as to their expert qualifications nor as
to their freedom from bias. The plaintiff did not come
forward with any rebuttal testimony tending in any way
to discredit in any respect the testimony of any of these
witnesses.
It is the position of the defendant that if there were
flies in the bottle from which the plaintiff drank (which
fact we assume to be true), either the bottle was bottled
by some bottler other than the defendant, or else those
flies were

~placed

in that bottle by some mischief-minded

third person after the bottle passed from the possession
and control of the defendant and into the control of
American Smelting & Refining Co. In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the defendant as to the
care exercised by it in its bottling process, no other conclusion is tenable. We do not concede that it would be
possible for flies to get into a bottle of Coca-Cola during
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any phase of the washing and bottling operations carried on by the defendant.
We also wish to point out to the court that the defendant is not liable as an insurer. The only duty imposed upon the defendant is the exercise of reasonable
care. While we readily concede that reasonable care in
the case of a person bottling beverages for human consumption would involve a very high degree of diligence,
we submit that the highest possible degree of diligence
and care has been exercised by the defendant in this
case. Assuming, "rithout in any way conceding, that flies
and other impurities got into the bottle of Coca-Cola
from which the plaintiff drank, during the defendant's
bottling lJ·rocess, such an event would have to be attributed to inevitable accident, and not to negligence on the
part of the defendant. What further care could possibly have been exercised by the defendant~ Wherein
can the defendant be said to have breeched its duty1
What possible further step could have been taken by
the defendant to insure that its :products would be
wholesome and fit for human consumption~ The plaintiff has failed to come forward with even a suggestion
as to what additional care the defendant might exercise
for the greater protection of the consumers of its
product. The evidence is overwhelming and uncontradicted that the bottling and washing process employed
by the defendant is safe, and is the best known to man.
The evidence is equally clear that the inspection procedure of the defendant is as "fool-proof" as the ingenuity of man can devise. If, then, by some wild stretch
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of the imagination, it could be said that the flies did get
into the bottle ''Thile it

\Yas

in the possession and control

of the defendant, that event must be charged to inevitable
accident. It can in no wise be said that the defendant
failed in the performance of its duty to exercise the
highest degree of diligence and to assure that its
product reached the market in a safe, sanitary and
wholesome condition. 'fhese views have been followed by
the courts in similar cases.
In Coca-Cola Bottling Company vs. Rowlan, 16 Tenn.
App. 184, 66 S.W. 2d 272, the defendant produced evidence as to its washing and bottling process quite similar
to the evidence of the defendant in the case at bar. The
washing process employed by the defendant in that case
was very similar to that employed by this defendant.
However, in that case the defendant produced no evidence of an electric eye inspection machine, whereas in
the case at bar the defendant produced evidence of this
additional safety factor.
Said the court in the Rowlan case :
''Without discussing the facts as disclosed by
the record further, we are of the opinion that the
plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant was
guilty of any negligence in this matter of bottling
Coca-Cola. To the contrary, we think that under
the facts of the record, it would have been physically impossible for a dead mouse to have been
hottled up in the Coca-Cola at the plant.
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"We are constrained to reach the conclusion
that there was no proof of negligence, and that
~any p~resurnption that may have been created by
the mere finding of a dead mouse in the bottle of
Coca-Cola is fully met by the evidence in the nature of physical facts introduced by the defendant
and hence the physical facts as sho\vn by the manner in which the Coca-Cola was processed make it
not ·only highly improbable, but ~practically impossible for the mouse to have been in the bottle
at the time it was filled with Coca-Cola, and delivered to the stand for sale.''
The Court also quoted with approval from Crigger
v. :Coca-~Cola Bottling Company, 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.\V....

155:
''That he who prepares and puts on the market in bottles or sealed packages, food, drugs, beverages, medicines or articles inherently dangerous, owes a high duty to the public in the care and
preparation of such commodities, and that a liability will exist regardless of privity of contract
to anyone injured for a failure to prop~erly safeguard and perform that duty. * * *
"This liability is based on an o1nission of
duty or an .act of negligence and the way should
be left op~en for the innocent to escape. However
exacting the duty or high the degree of care to
furnish pure foods, beverages and medicines, we
believe with Judge Cooley as expressed in Brown
vs. Marshall * * * [47 Mich. 576, 11 N.W. 392],
that negligence is a necess~ary element in the
right of action and the better authorities have not
gone so far as to dispense with actual negligence
as a prerequisite to the liability. In fact, there is
no logical basis for liability for personal injury
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without some negligent act or omission." (Italics
added.)
The foregoing quotation 'Yas also quoted with approval in ;]Jerri.man vs .. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., (Tenn.),
68 S.W. 2d 149. The san1e thought

"~as

also expressed in

Enloe vs. Charlotte ·Coca...,Cola Bottling Co., supra. See

also Blaclf!lcell vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 208 N.C.

751, 182 S.E. 469, and Horn & H. Baking Company vs.
Lieber, supra.
See also 38 Am. Jur. 1005, Negligence, Sec. 308,
where it is said :
"In no event, however, will the applic-ation of
this doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] affect the broad,
well settled, rule that when the evidence is so
clear and convincing that reasonable minds would
not differ in their conclusions therefrom, the question of defendant's negligence is for the court
and not for the jury.''
And, to the same effect, see 38 Am. Jur .. 1063, Negligence, Sec. 335.
We submit that the defendant conclusively demonstrated that its washing and bottling process was the
best and safest devisable by the ingenuity of man, and
that no further steps to safeguard life, health and safety
of the consuming public could have been taken by the
defendant, and it must therefore be held as a matter of
law that the defendant was free of negligence.
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POINT 2.
PLAINTIF·F'S ATTORNEY \\TAS GUILTY OF
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR SUCH AS TO REQUIRE THE SETTING
ASIDE OF THE VER.DICT AND JUSTIFYING AN
ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
During the cross-examination of Peter I-Ianes,
counsel for the plaintiff asked the \vitness the following
question:
"I notice that your attorney is checking your
questions quite carefully with the transcript. Have
you testified a good deal in these eases ~ ''
Objections were promptly interposed by the defendant,
and the court struck the question and the answer and
instructed the jury to disregard it. (R. 132.)
Notwithstanding the court's ruling that any reference to· other trials was improper, counsel for the plaintiff persisted in seeking to inject into the record the
notion that the defendant company was frequently called
up·on to defend suits of this nature.
Again at R. 144, counsel for the plaintiff, on crossexamination of Raymond Wilmert, asked this question:
''If the Coca-Cola Company should lose a few
of these lawsuits * * * ''
Again objection was interposed. Counsel for the plaintiff did not persist in the question at that time, but
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shortly thereafter, on re-cross-examination of Mr. J. T.
Holding, counsel asked the \Yi tness :
''You haYe been subpoenaed before to testify
in these cases for ~fr. Moreton, haven't you~''
(R. 159.)
Again objection was ·promptly interposed and again the
court sustained the objection and struck it from the
record, and instructed the jury to disregard it.
The only apparent purpose for such questions could
be to conYey to the jury the impression that the defendant was frequently called upon to defend la\vsuits involving impure products. Counsel persisted in attem.p.ting to put this notion before the jury although the court
consistently, and quite correctly, ruled that such matters
were entirely improper. While there is no way of showing that the jury was influenced, or was not influenced,
by these irrelevant rna tters, it is only fair to assume that
such had a prejudicial effect upon the defense interposed
by the defendant.
It must be remembered that the defense relied upon
principally by the defendant was that its bottling process
was so efficient and so perfect that it would be impossible for impure or foreign materials to get into its
bottled

p~roduct.

Insinuations that the defendant was

frequently called upon to defend suits of this nature
would naturally cause the jury to believe that the process
was not as efficient as testified to by the defendant's
witnesses.
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It is a well recognized rule that misconduct on the
part of counsel such as results in the opposite party
being denied a fair trial, is prejudicial error and grounds
for granting of a new trial or reversal on appeal. Thus
it is said in 39 Am. Jur. 71, New Trial, Sec. 53:
''Misconduct of counsel for ·one p·arty, if of
such a nature as to influence a verdict in favor
of that party, or to prevent the -adverse party
from having a fair trial is, if proper and timely
objection thereto is made, ground for a new trial.
* • • Where there is any misconduct on the part
of counsel for the prevailing party which appears
to have been liable, even though not intended to
have ·a pernicious effect upon legal proceedings,
or a prevailing influence on the jury, there is
reason for treating the trial as a mistrial and
directing that the judgment be set aside.''
And at :page 72, Sec. 54 it is said :
"Improp.er remarks and comments of counsel
for a party, made in the presence and hearing of
the jury, if of such ch·aracter as to influence a verdict, prevent a fair trial, etc., may, when the
complaining party has made proper and timely
objection and sought to have the harmful effect
thereof removed by an instruction to the Jury,
furnish good grounds for a new trial.''
See also 3 Am. Jur. 608, Appeal and Error, Sec. 1060,
where it is said:
''Thus, it has been held reversible error for
counsel in examining witnesses, to bring before
the jury irrelevant evidence of colla ter·al rna tters
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for the purpose of prejudicing, or tending to
prejudice, the jury against the opposing parties,
as~ for example, in a negligence action, the fact
that the defendant is insured. '*' * *
''Asking the opposing party questions which
he knows to be wholly improper, in order to place
before the jury inadmissible evidence, and attempting to introduce previously excluded evidence by making statements of ·alleged facts in
asking questions of witnesses may also be reversible error.''
It is interesting to observe that in recent years there
has been an increasing tendency on the part of attorneys
to bring improper matters before the jury by ingenious
and devious methods. In 39 Am.. Jur. 80, New Trial, Sec.
65, it is said:
''Misconduct of counsel may consist in attempting to get before the jury matters not in
issue and not properly matters for the consideration of the jury by means of asking witnesses improper questions or making improper offers of
rproof. In recent years there has been a decided
increase in the number of cases in which complaint has been made of prejudice suffered by
reason of such misconduct, and frequently a new
trial is sought and granted on this ground, particularly where an attorney persistently pursues
a wholly unjustified and prejudicial course of interrogation, notwithstanding the objections made
by counsel for the opposing party litigant and
sustained by the court.''
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And at page 81 it is said:
"Unsupported statements of fact which have
been made by counsel for the prevailing party in
the presence of the jury, and which were prejudicial to the opposing party, will also afford cause
for a new trial. ' '
The same thought is expressed in the excellent annotation on this question in 109 A.L.R. 1089 where it is
said:
''An examination of the case digests shows
that in the last twenty ye·ars there has been a
decided increase in the percentage of jury cases
wherein complaint has been made of :prejudice suffered by reason of the misconduct of counsel in
the examination of witnesses. Much of this misconduct has consisted of knowingly asking improper questions. In many cases the attorney
complained of has :persistently pursued a wholly
unjustified ·and prejudicial course of interrogation, notwithstanding objections made and sustained, clearly called to his attention, if such a
thing could be deemed necessary, that the questions asked were without any plausible legal foundation. Reversals have frequently been granted
in cases of that extreme character.''
And at page 1096, by way of summary of the annotation, it is said:
"In fine, one may say that the extent to which,
in jury trials, the practice of knowingly asking
witnesses improper and prejudicial questions has
come to be indulged in, indicates the need for a
policy which will make the I}ractice unprofitable.
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The fact that attorneys have e·arnestly argued
that they are entitled to the 'benefit' before the
jury of their opponent's action in objecting to
such questions is significant of the extent to which
fidelity to the ideal of justice has yielded to the
unbridled notion that the administration of the
law is a game in vvhich victory belongs to him who
is most ingenious in turning the existing rules to
his advantage. Verdicts so gained should not be
retained. To use the language of the Kentucky
Supreme Court, 'No litigant should be permitted
to profit by such J?Tactice.' ''
We have been unable to discover a case exactly in
point with the facts of the case at bar. Perhaps the
closest is Louisville .cf Nashville R.ailway Co. v. Payne,
133 Ky. 539, 118 S.W. 352, 19 Ann. Cases 294. In that
case, plaintiff's counsel repeatedly asked incompetent
questions attempting to establish that the servants in
charge of the defendant's trains on other occasions had
been guilty of acts of negligence similar in character to
that for which recovery was sought in that case. In reversing the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky said:

'' * * * in a case like that here p·resented,
where counsel persistently pursues a line of interrogation which the court rules to be wrong,
and which one reasonably well acquainted with
the rules governing the ·admission of evidence
must know to be improper, the conclusion is irresistable that it is done for the purpose of influencing and prejudicing the minds of the jury in
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cause of his kindness of heart, or long-suffering
and forbearing nature, ;permits it to go unpunished, there remains nothing to do but deprive
the one offending of the fruits of his victory thus
earned. This case must be reversed for other
reasons; but, if there were none such, this misconduct upon the part of plaintiff's counsel would
furnish abundant grounds for reversal.
"Where the record shows that an attorney
persistently and dogmatically pursues a line of
interrogation over the objection of opposing
counsel and the adverse ruling of the court to the
extent here shown, the conclusion is irresistable
that such was not due to error of judgment, but
in pursuance of a determination to present the
matter about which the questions are asked to
the jury in spite of court and counsel. Such
conduct should neither be tolerated nor excused
by the trial court, and no litigant should be permitted to profit by such practice.''
For other authorities supporting the same general
rule, see 6 Ann. Cases 224, 19 Ann. Cases 296, A1~n. Cases
1917A 441.
It is with some reluctance that we have urged this
point upon the court and, in so doing, we do not wish to
be understood as accusing counsel for the plaintiff of
deliberate bad faith. However, regardless of the motives
that may have prompted him in bringing these irrelevant
matters before the jury, it can only be fair to assume
that the jury was imp~roperly influenced and that .such
conduct redounded to the prejudice of the defendant.
Verdicts gained by the aid of such method should not be
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retained. As said by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
the case of Louis-ville & Nashville R . Co. v·. Payne, supra:
''No litigant should be permitted to
such practice.''

p~rofit

by

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the record contains
no evidence whatsoever of any negligence on the part of
the defendant, but that, on the contrary, the record conclusively shows that the defendant exercised the highest
possible degree of care in the bottling of its product.
Therefore the judgment of the Trial Court should
be set aside and the Trial Court directed to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant, no cause of action.
It is further submitted that the misconduct on the
part of plaintiff's counsel resulted in the defendant being denied fair trial.
ResJJectfully,
MoRETON, CHRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN,
ELIAS

L.

DAY

Attorneys for Defendant .and Appellant.
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